Monday, May 15, 2006

Iran Tried to Acquire Nuclear Weapons from Pakistan

Former Pakistan's army chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, recently disclosed to the Associated Press how Iran had approached Pakistan for close to 20 years to obtain conventional arms and then technology for nuclear weapons.

In 1990, while he was Pakistan’s army chief of staff, Iranians visited him to try to acquire nuclear bombs: “They didn't want the technology. They asked: 'Can we have a bomb?' My answer was: By all means you can have it but you must make it yourself. Nobody gave it to us.” Beg added that former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto even told him the Iranians offered more than $4 billion for the technology.

Beg, who believes that Iran has had enough time to build nuclear weapons, received a delegation from the Iranian Embassy in Pakistan last January, seeking advice on how to head off an attack on their nuclear facilities, based on his own experience dealing with India's nuclear threat. His recommendations were to “make it clear that if anything happens to Iran, if anyone attacks it, that Iran's answer will be to hit Israel” and to be ready to “degrade the defense systems of Israel”.

Saturday, May 13, 2006

Highly Enriched Uranium Found in Iran

Yesterday, diplomats reported that U.N. inspectors had found traces of highly enriched uranium on equipment that came from a former Iranian military base. The density of enrichment appears to be well above the low-enrichment levels required to produce electricity and not far below the level needed to make nuclear warheads. If confirmed, this report would prove that a/ Iran is enriching uranium at much higher levels than announced, and b/ its nuclear program is not purely civilian.

Interestingly enough, the equipment came from the Lavizan complex, an undeclared facility in a military base which became public after Iranian exiles disclosed its existence. Suspected to be a major center of research into nuclear enrichment, the site was razed and its topsoil removed by the Iranians after the disclosure and before the IAEA would be allowed to visit it… More recently, and as the Telegraph reported, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards cut down thousands of trees in a parkland next to the Lavizan complex, raising further suspicion that the trees may have contained incriminating nuclear traces.

This recent discovery is just the latest proof that Iran's nuclear program is aimed at developing nuclear weapons. One may even wonder why proofs are needed for a country which has the world's second largest natural gas reserves and the third largest oil reserves in the world, and who really does not need nuclear energy. Once again, discussions will take place at the IAEA, at the UN, and in the Western World, and precious time will be lost while the Iranians pursue their apocalyptic nuclear dream…

Monday, May 01, 2006

A New Strategy on Iran by Dennis Ross

Dennis Ross, special Middle East coordinator under President Bill Clinton, just wrote an interesting piece in the Washington Post on how to best deal with Iran. Here are some excerpts:
“The United States and Iran are playing programmed roles in a minuet on nuclear weapons. The United States pushes the U.N. Security Council to warn Iran about the consequences of going nuclear. And Iran continues its march toward development of nuclear power, even as its president declares that ‘we don't give a damn’ about U.N. resolutions calling on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment.

With the Russians and Chinese seemingly determined to block sanctions, our efforts at the United Nations promise to evolve slowly while Iran presses ahead with its plans. If we stay on the same path, we will be left with two choices: accept the reality of Iran's nuclear weapons capability or take military action to set back its ambitions.

Either outcome could prove disastrous. If Iran succeeds, in all likelihood we will face a nuclear Middle East. The Saudis -- fearing an emboldened Iran determined to coerce others and to promote Shiite subversion in the Arabian Peninsula -- will seek their own nuclear capability, and probably already have a deal with Pakistan to provide it should Iran pose this kind of threat. And don't expect Egypt to be content with Saudi Arabia's being the only Arab country with a nuclear ‘deterrent’.

As for those who think that the nuclear deterrent rules that governed relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War will also apply in a nuclear Middle East: Don't be so confident. For one thing, the possible number of nuclear countries will drive up the potential for miscalculation. For another, with an Iranian president who sees himself as an instrument for accelerating the coming of the 12th Imam -- which is preceded in the mythology by the equivalent of Armageddon -- one should not take comfort in thinking that Iran will act responsibly.

But the alternative of using force to prevent or forestall the Iranians' going nuclear does not look much better. To begin with, there are no simple or clean military options. Air operations alone might involve striking hundreds of targets, many in populated areas where there are significant air defense capabilities in the process of being upgraded by the Russians. The more casualties we inflict, the more we inflame the Islamic world.

Perhaps we could manage the response if the military campaign inflicted relatively few casualties and succeeded in setting back the Iranian nuclear program. But such a rosy scenario assumes that Iran's ability to retaliate is relatively limited. Even if we have the means to prevent the Iranian navy and air force from shutting down shipping into and out of the Persian Gulf, Iran has other options for turning any effort to take out its nuclear capability into a wider war….

The challenge remains one of changing the Iranian calculus. Iran must see that it either loses more than it gains by proceeding to move toward nuclear weapons or that it can gain more by giving up the effort. The problem with the current policy is that it threatens costs that either aren't believable or are likely to pale in comparison with what the Iranians see themselves gaining with nuclear power.

But what if we could threaten collective sanctions that the Iranians would see as biting? What if those were combined with possible gains in terms of a deal on nuclear energy, economic benefits and security understandings if the Iranians would give up the nuclear program? …

Why not have the president go to his British, French and German counterparts and say: We will join you at the table with the Iranians, but first let us agree on an extensive set of meaningful -- not marginal -- economic and political sanctions that we will impose if the negotiations fail. Any such agreement would also need to entail an understanding of what would constitute failure in the talks and the trigger for the sanctions…

Real economic sanctions would not just bite Iran and its ability to generate revenue but also would undoubtedly drive up the price of oil. Our readiness to accept that risk at a time when high gasoline prices are becoming a domestic political issue would convey a very different signal about our seriousness to the Iranians -- who presently don't fear sanctions because they think they have the world over a barrel.

There is no guarantee such an approach will work with Iran. This Iranian government may simply be determined to have nuclear weapons. If that is the case, and if President Bush is determined to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons -- as he has said -- we would still be better off having tried a direct negotiating option before resorting to what inevitably will be a difficult, messy use of force once again.”